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	(1) Aim and Means
	Empathy is commonly defined simply as the ability to experience what another person is feeling. It has been the object of a surge of interest in recent philosophical literature where it has been attributed a key role in important aspects of human life, both cognitive and motivational. It is deemed to be, among other things, a vehicle for actual participation in the feelings of other persons (De Jaegher 2015, p. 127), and for ‘intimate engagement’ in their ‘transparent minds’ (Reddy 2008, p. 28). Then again, it has been claimed to be a crucial source of caring for others and of concern for their welfare (C. D. Batson 1991; Martin Hoffman 2000; Michael Slote 2007). As such, it has been touted to be the unrecognized and implicit foundation of morality and moral obligation towards others. Such impressive claims invite investigation of the topic.
	Empathizing may take a number of different forms. It may be a matter of understanding another person’s feelings and actions; it may involve imagining what it is like to be the other person; it may be the involuntary echoing of another’s feelings. The latter is the form at work when we find ourselves feeling depressed in the company of someone suffering from depression, or feeling cheered up on being greeted with a vivacious smile. It is often called ‘emotional contagion’, but Daniel Stern more aptly terms it ‘affective echoing’ (1985, p. 144). The present essay explores the nature of affective echoing, and after clarifying somewhat its nature, attempts to give a cogent assessment of the roles it may play.  
	Empathy is affective in nature, and, like consciousness or cognition, is not only a feature of us humans indispensable to our being the animate organisms we are, but also one directly accessible to investigation only in first-person experience. In these circumstances it would be prima facie absurd for anyone hoping to understand its nature, not to investigate it from a first-person point of view. It would in fact be equally absurd to exclude the findings of such an approach from the corpus of our knowledge of the world on the ground that they are subjective. The term ‘subjective’, it should be noted, has several distinct senses. Phenomena accessible only to first-person investigation are obviously subjective in the sense of being private, as in Wittgenstein’s metaphor of a beetle in a box (Wittgenstein 1963, p. 100). They are nevertheless not for this reason any less real, or any less important to human life. First-person phenomena may on occasion also be subjective in the quite different sense of being idiosyncratic. However, when first-person investigation focuses on the general features of particular types of phenomena, such as ways of thinking or the nature of feelings, its findings are quite unlikely to be idiosyncratic. The claim that first-person findings are subjective in the further sense of being unverifiable by others, is clearly overstated. All such findings are open to corroboration or contradiction by the findings of other impartial and careful observers.
	Accordingly, the present essay investigates affective echoing from a first-person point of view. The phenomenological method employed is derived from that of Edmund Husserl. It requires that in examining one’s experience, one suspend one’s usual assumptions and beliefs so as to view the experience as if for the first time, and so determine what exactly is actually present in that experience. Since the experience being examined is one in which one is oneself engaged, a phenomenologist has the somewhat awkward and arduous task of filling two roles at the same time–of being a detached, scrupulous observer of experience while also being an active participant in that experience. The assignment requires making rapid shifts of attention and careful extrapolations.
	Casual scrutiny finds any experience to have two sorts of constituents: those actually present sensuously and those present but not sensuously so. The latter ‘non-sensuous’ constituents are judged to be present because they are found to be essential to the experience: without them the experience would no longer be the one it actually is. These non-sensuously present elements are a varied lot, and include an immediate past, which although past is nevertheless retained in mind, an assumed present and an anticipated future in the form of presently hidden aspects of things, their properties, dispositions, and afforded possibilities (See Husserl, 1913/1983, pp. 57-62, 166-7). Descartes terms these latter elements ‘ideas’ or ‘thoughts’, and characterizes them as non-extended or non-spatial (Descartes 1642/1984, pp. 113, 127). Husserl speaks instead of meaning, and characterizes as ‘intentional’ the acts of being directed toward, or conscious of these ‘hidden’ aspects of things (Husserl 1913/1983, pp. 73-5). Given the sensuous/non-sensuous division in the constituents of experience, a useful ploy in analyzing an experience is first to rigorously determine what is actually present sensuously in the experience, and subsequently to uncover what further elements are present as thought or meaning. 
	It turns out that an adequate account of affective echoing requires viewing the phenomenon in the light of background information from two topics, the relevance of which to present concerns is perhaps not immediately obvious. One of these is the nature of feelings generally. The other is the nature of perceptual cognition independent of language, or non-linguistic cognition. We shall briefly consider each topic before taking up that of affective echoing.
	(2) The Nature of Feelings
	Feelings may be roughly characterized as any of the bodily or mental entities making an adjectival appearance in answer to the question, “How are you feeling?” They include such things as feelings of well-being, fitness, dizziness, distress, or nausea–what might be termed ‘vitality affects’ (Stern 1985, p. 55). They include the automatic responses elicited by whole-bodied sensations of cold, warmth, pain, pleasure, or intense sensation–what might be termed ‘somatic responses’. They include moods and existential attitudes (see Ratcliffe 2008, p. 38). They include emotions, such as feelings of anger, affection, grief, joy, disgust, and appreciation, whether free-floating or directed at some object, event, or situation perceived or thought. They include cognitive affects such as surprise, doubt, conviction. They include wants, desires, and feelings of moral obligation. They do not include local perturbations such as the cold in one’s feet, the itch on one’s back, or the roughness felt under one’s finger-tips. 
	Feelings so understood are holistic in the sense that they involve the whole body. A brief consultation with one’s bodily experience of the various feelings listed above finds them to do so in several ways. A certain hedonic tone (pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral) pervades one’s body, as does also a certain energy, and a certain tensional dynamics (contractive, arrestive, or expansive). The intensity of each of these may vary somewhat with topology. Each type of feeling has its own typical bodily regimen of hedonic feelings, energy, and tensions, a regimen in virtue of which one commonly identifies how one is feeling. For instance, on a general level, surprise immobilizes, cold contracts, fear rigidifies, while contentment calms, warmth relaxes, delight lifts up. On the more specific level of chest and throat, grief or pain tightly constricts one’s breath, contentment leaves breath placid and regular, while joy makes it bubble up, a point already noted by Descartes (1985, p. 363). A particular typical tensional dynamics is essential to one’s being in a certain affective state. If one felt no lassitude, no pained inner contraction in thinking of a friend’s death, then one would not feel grieved.
	While feelings might be characterized aptly enough as dynamic modes of the body, it should however be added that they involve more than the body alone. Feelings also pervade the dynamics of one’s voice and any activity one undertakes; they skew one’s thinking and one’s judgment, and they color the way the world appears to be, making it dreary or hostile, inviting or glorious. The latter effect is undoubtedly in part responsible for the impression that despite their ostensibly bodily nature, feelings are atmospheric or ethereal in nature.
	An important feature of feelings is their autonomy: they arise independently of one’s doing. One finds oneself feeling dazed and sluggish on waking up, chilly on getting out of bed, enlivened by the sunny view from one’s window, annoyed at the thought that one is late. All of these feelings arise either on their own or elicited by an encounter, and are not one’s doing in any straightforward sense. One may subsequently embrace the feelings, nourish them, i.e., let them expand unopposed and supplement them with voluntary congruent tensions as well as with the embellishments and restrictions thought appropriate by the culture in which one lives. Nevertheless, generally speaking one cannot create them; they happen. 
	Directed emotions may be an apparent exception of sorts to this rule due to the fact that they are elicited by beliefs. As a result, one may conjure them up by convincing oneself of the truth of something one knows to be false, that is, through lying to oneself in ‘bad faith’ (Sartre, 1956, pp. 86f). A similar more temporary result may be achieved through pretense or ‘make-believe’ of the sort practiced by actors and their audiences.
	An interesting related feature of feelings is that they are not fully replicatable voluntarily. Any attempt to replicate them inevitably generates something that feels different from the original. It feels different, not simply because it contains feelings of effort absent from the original, but more importantly, because certain tensions present in the original are absent from the imitation. Since these tensions cannot be replicated voluntarily, try as one might, they must be involuntary. As such they must also be innate, for if they were  acquired through learning and repetition, they would be replicatable (Johnstone, 2012, pp. 190-191; 2013, p. 20ff). To the extent that feelings contain irreplicatable tensional shifts, they are innate and in all likelihood pan-cultural, and perhaps to some extent pan-animate.
	The tensions and tensional shifts integral to one’s mien, posture, and activity, particularly the involuntary ones, are what allow other persons to perceive how one is feeling. They are essential constituents of the feelings (necessary but not sufficient), the removal of which would result in one’s no longer having the feelings. These typical felt tensions are contemporaneous with topologically and dynamically congruent tensions in one’s body as seen by others. An essential aspect of those feelings–their dynamics–is on display. The facial congestion, glaring eyes, and locked square mouth integral to the anger I feel is simultaneously present on my face, integral to the anger others see there. Consequently, although certain aspects of one’s feelings cannot be seen by others, aspects that are part of one’s private world such as their kinesthesia, their hedonic tone, their hidden interior tensions, and their eliciting thoughts, one’s feelings are nevertheless to some extent visible and hence knowable by others.
	It might be protested that people often feign feelings, that often they are socially constrained to do so, and that consequently any knowledge of another person’s feelings is tenuous at best. However, although pretense is rampant in interpersonal relationships, the fact remains that feelings arise involuntarily, each type with its own set of typical involuntary tensions, and that the latter cannot be voluntarily replicated or feigned. One knows (or can know) from the experience of one’s own feelings which tensions are voluntary, which involuntary. Consequently, at least to the extent that the observed tensions of another person are topologically and dynamically congruent with one’s own experienced genuine feelings, one can be certain of how that person is feeling. A clear instance of such knowing is in the mutual delight elicited on a chance encounter with a dear friend. The initial involuntary upsurge is genuine and recognized as such, as is in fact also the subsequent voluntary espousal enmeshed with the involuntary tensions.
	(3) Non-Linguistic Cognition 
	It is an often ignored fact that much of our everyday awareness of the world takes place without involving language, and often without visual imagery. Instances of such awareness abound. Most of the colors, odors, sounds, and textures I encounter every day, I automatically experience as familiar, and do so even when I have no name or description for the specific quality that differentiates them from others. I readily recognize my brother’s voice, for instance, or the peculiar smell of rosemary. Likewise, I commonly recognize acquaintances, cats, or birds through their facial features, silhouettes, and proportions, the gait or movements unique to the individual or species, which features I am quite incapable of describing adequately in language.
	My awareness of the objects about me, what they feel or taste like, what their other sides look like, what they are like inside, how they behave if squeezed or dropped, what it is possible to do with them, has for the most part been acquired through personal experience, not verbal teaching. I know my own body well and am passably skilled at moving it about, without ever having been told where to find my feet, or how to scratch an itch. I make my way about the house and over familiar terrain mostly by recognizing familiar places and knowing where to go next, with no need for verbal instructions, and without ever having received any. My non-linguistic awareness is presumably of the same sort as that through which animals and infants find their way about in the world.​[1]​ 
	If, as a phenomenologist, I were to step out of full engagement in non-linguistic awareness of the above sort, and attempt to determine what is present in the experience, I would find at the focus of my attention a sensuous array decked out with meaning of two sorts. One of these is the fruit of what Husserl terms ‘retention’, the lingering on into the sensuous present of events from the now gone immediate past. The other is from what he terms ‘protention’, anticipations of things present but hidden, and of things yet to come in the immediate future (Husserl, 1964, pp. 44, 76, 139). The two flesh out what is sensuously present, and make it into an object, a process actually observable on occasion when waking up.
	Whereas in linguistic thinking the meaning-carriers are strings of words, in non-linguistic perception they are the sensuous configurations at which attention is directed. The carried meaning makes its appearances for the most part automatically with the focusing of attention on the sensuous meaning-carrier, and rarely requires a moment of reflection or effort on one’s part. In this particular regard, it resembles the linguistic meaning of a familiar string of words which is likewise immediately present on one’s hearing or seeing the words, conjured up automatically and seemingly impossible to remove.	
	The meaning-carriers of non-symbolic cognition acquire their anticipatory or intentional meaning through past experience. I automatically expect what looks like a book to contain pages with lines of print, and that because such has been the case in my past experience of books. Likewise, on seeing pigeons in a park, I find myself expecting them to act in a way similar to what I have seen similar creatures do in the past, walk stiffly in circles with bobbing heads and necks, and make cooing noises. Without the prior experience, expectations of the sort would not arise.
	An important area of such immediate non-reflective meaning conferral, one important for present concerns, is our non-symbolic awareness of other persons. That awareness may encompass what they are doing, how they are feeling, what they intend to do, even what they are thinking. Insofar as it is an awareness of others’ feelings, it is an awareness of something present within their bodies (and minds), hence present in regions usually assumed to be inaccessible to one’s direct observation. Given this fact, such awareness might be termed, following Husserl (1973, p. 109), ‘analogical apperception’ instead of ‘perception’.
	Despite the terminological divide, analogical apperception takes place in essentially the same manner as does ordinary perception. One's lived body is always present to some degree in the field of one's awareness, with its heaviness and insipidity, its volatile buoyancies, irritations, and urgencies, any of which at any time may be brought into sharper focus with a shift of attention. One’s awareness of its hedonic cast and shifting affective dynamics, if only peripheral, is made unavoidable by the mere fact of being conscious. One is familiar with one’s feelings and thoughts, with what it is like to be animate, to move autonomously, to stretch, to kick, to look, to feel lively or sluggish, joyous or dejected, chilly or excited. To encounter another person is to encounter a being like oneself, one who moves autonomously, whose visible topology and tensional dynamics are familiar because they are congruent with one’s own present and past felt topology and dynamics. The person’s confidence, agitation, dejection, and elation are consequently visibly present in those tensional dynamics. One sees the fear present on the other’s rigid staring face, the delight in the other’s prancing about, or the grief in the other’s sobbing huddled posture. One also perceives (apperceives) another person’s intentions in the person’s movements and activity in context, as Reddy so persuasively points out (Reddy 2008, p. 154), the force of the person’s desire and determination visibly present in the intensity of the displayed tensional dynamics. This awareness of the other person’s inner life is immediate, non-symbolic, non-reflective, and involuntarily elicited.​[2]​
	(4) Affective Echoing 
	Dynamic echoing is more widespread than commonly thought. Music readily elicits in one’s body a congruent rhythm and affective mode. The weather or one’s surrounds have a subtler but analogous effect. An absorbing spectacle, whether a dance performance or football game, invariably elicits kinesthesia that echo the movements of the performers. The feelings pervading a surrounding crowd tend to awaken an irresistible similar affective dynamics in oneself. Most widespread of all
is the affective echoing elicited in face-to-face interchanges with other persons.
	In close proximity of the sort, the other person’s feelings readily become a prominent feature of the situation, and one invariably finds one’s body echoing the person’s feelings to some degree, feeling pleasantly relaxed if the person is in a good mood, tensing up if the person is anxious or disgruntled, hunching up if the person looks chilled. These elicited feelings arise involuntarily (as do feelings generally), and only subsequently may be espoused or shunned through voluntary tensional shifts on one’s part. Their occurrence requires that one’s attention should focus on the visibly present aspects of the person’s feelings, and hence that one not be so preoccupied with other concerns or striking aspects of the situation as to fail to notice how the person is feeling. It also requires that one not be reverberating strongly with other feelings since one’s body cannot be in two conflicting dynamic states at the same instant. It would be impossible, for instance, to echo someone’s placidity while seething with outrage.
	What elicits the echoing feelings in oneself are the feelings that one analogically apperceives the other person as having. In virtue of his/her facial expression, tensional stance, and movement dynamics, the other person is apperceived as an animate sentient being, one suffused with feelings of a specific sort dynamically congruent with the perceived tensions. These feelings are present intentionally in the experience, not sensuously, and are similar in hedonic tone, energy, and dynamics to ones that one feels on occasion in one’s own body. 
	On apperceiving the feelings, one immediately feels dynamically and hedonically similar feelings arising in one’s own body, the intensity of which echoes the intensity of the visibly present dynamics of the other person’s body. No reflection is necessary, no voluntary activity on one’s part. The feelings simply appear, accompanied by an atmosphere of similar hedonic tone that permeates the perceived world. Only subsequently may one act on the feelings by either espousing them or opposing them. Interestingly enough, since they arise involuntarily, they must also be irreplicatable voluntarily, a point one may easily verify for oneself experientially. Consequently, echoing must be an innate capacity, one that as such may be encouraged or suppressed to some degree, but one everyone originally has.  	Provided they are adequately on display, one may apparently echo feelings of any sort–any emotion, mood, desire, interest, urgency, or agitation–but only the dynamics of the feeling. Although the echoed feelings (those of the other person) may have an intentional object, the echoing feelings (those within oneself) are not directed at anything. In this regard they resemble moods. For instance, another person’s perceived interest in some topic may automatically elicit in oneself similar feelings of interest, but the elicited feelings are not feelings of interest in the topic. Indeed, on consulting the topic, one may find it quite uninteresting. Similarly, one may echo the bodily contraction and inner sinking of a frightened person, the dynamics, but be quite unaware of what the person is frightened of. In fact, the intentional object of the other person’s feelings could at most be marginally present in the experience. If it were made the focus of one’s attention, then one’s own affective response to the object would replace one’s response to the other’s feelings. The echoing of another person’s feelings requires that one’s attention be focused on those feelings, and as is the case with directed emotions generally, it fades away when attention is directed elsewhere.
	Since echoing feelings arise on one’s becoming aware of the other person’s feelings, it takes little reflection on one’s part to realize that one’s feelings are being elicited by those of the other person. For similar reasons, the affective atmosphere accompanying the feelings is felt to be something the other person exudes. Because of the similarity in nature and intensity of one’s own feelings with the feelings perceived as present in the other person’s body, one has the impression of sharing the person’s feelings, of feeling the other person’s pain, the other person’s delight or fear. One has even the impression that the feelings of the other person have infiltrated one’s body, and so in some manner are present within oneself. The impression is somewhat similar to the one that arises when absorbing warmth from another person’s body, and feeling that the absorbed warmth is somehow the other person. One’s affective response to the situation, as when sitting down on a recently occupied warm chair, can range from endearment to near nausea depending on one’s prior affective dispositions toward the other person.
	Since affective echoing relies on analogical apperception, it reveals no further information beyond what the latter gleans as to how another person is feeling. What echoing does is make the other’s feelings more real. Whereas in analogical apperception the other’s feelings are present as meaning (accompanied perhaps by incipient kinesthesia), in echoing they are vividly present, as vividly present and as real as one’s own feelings. Indeed, they are in fact present as feelings in one’s own flesh, and as such incline one to act. In addition, the latter feelings seem to partake of the feelings present in the other person. 
	Thus, although echoing makes no cognitive difference, it goes beyond analogizing apperception by making three significant affective differences. 
a) It makes the other person’s feelings vividly present, as real as one’s own.
b) It infuses one’s flesh with like feelings, feelings strong enough to incline one to act or do something about them.
c) It allows one to share the other person’s feelings. 
	Let us look more closely at how each plays out.
	(5) The Role of Echoing in Interpersonal Relations 
	In making the feelings of others vividly present, affective echoing takes one outside what is otherwise a state of affective solipsism in which the only feelings one experiences are one’s own. It brings the feelings of others into one’s world. By the same token it brings them to prominence and so make them less easy to ignore. Thus, one might say that echoing makes other people matter more, for better or for worse, in one’s life. Their feelings invade, opt one’s attention, and so may awaken one’s interest. One’s own feelings, of course, have the same effect on others, and so may awaken their interest. Since feelings are integral to all of a person’s actions as well as to what is felt to matter in life, their availability to the vivid awareness of other persons is hardly a trivial matter.  
	The second above-noted effect of echoing is to put one in an affective state similar to that of the other person. When the echoed feelings are positive ones such as contentment, warmth, optimism, or delight, the echoing feelings introduced into one’s body feel good. They please; they lift one’s spirits. One is inclined to espouse and enjoy them. In these circumstances, simply being with the other person makes for a pleasant experience. That pleasant experience, particularly when repeated, leads naturally enough to one’s liking the other person and liking to be with him or her, possibly to attachment. In turn, a liking may well give birth to a caring or concern for the person, either an altruistic caring based on an appreciation of the person as someone likeable, lovable, ‘a jolly good fellow’, or alternatively an egoistic caring for the person, one that is appropriative and self-serving. 
	Echoing rarely remains a simple one-way relationship. One’s awareness of being at the center of the other person’s attention may suggest non-verbally that one is to some extent the source of the other’s good feeling, hence pleasing to others, a realization that in turn tends to make one feel good about oneself. In addition, one’s positive response to another’s good feelings tends to elicit good feeling in the other person. A continuing spiral of good feeling may result with the good feeling in each person eliciting good feeling in the other. A common instance of echoing of the sort is that of laughter in a group where each person is moved to laugh by the laughter of the others. Experiences of the sort tend to promote mutual good feeling and subsequently mutual caring.	
	The situation with regard to the echoing of negative feelings is quite different. Echoing of the sort is unpleasant whether it is a matter of echoing pain, grief, disappointment, anger, fear, or anxiety. In the presence of a person so afflicted, uncomfortable contractions, tensions, and agitations gradually infuse one’s body, uninvited and irrefragable as long as attention remains focused on the person. The discomfort elicited becomes difficult to bear. One’s impulse is not to espouse the feelings, but to shift attention elsewhere, to be concerned with something else, or better still, to flee the scene, which is usually what one does unless otherwise deterred. An alternative course of action, one less immediately obvious and less easily executed, is to relieve one’s discomfort by relieving that of the other person. Accordingly, one provides care for the person in pain because one cannot stand the sight of suffering. Neither course involves concern for the afflicted person. For concern to be elicited, clearly something further is needed.
	A strong candidate for that role is one’s having prior good feelings towards the other person. Having such feelings entails valuing the person to some degree. In these circumstances, the negative feelings afflicting the person may be experienced as an assault on something one values. Concern becomes appropriate, and the echoed unpleasant feelings become an incentive to help rather than to look away or flee.  
	Interestingly enough, when one has good feelings toward a person, the echoing of the person’s directed feelings may also help to inculcate directed emotional dispositions. Although the intentional object of the person’s emotion may be unknown, it is usually possible to discover what that object is. Moved by one’s good feelings toward the person, one may well feel inclined, in bad faith, to endow the object with characteristics capable of eliciting emotions of the sort the other person has. Since echoing has already infused one’s body with the feelings typical of that emotion, the transformation of one’s undirected feelings into directed ones is greatly facilitated. Psychological manoeuvres of the sort are as pervasive as the bad faith they require. With their help, echoing may lead easily to an enriching expansion of one’s interests and values just as it may also lead to the propagation of hate, racism, and religious intolerance.
	The third effect listed above is the impression that echoing gives of one’s sharing the feelings of another person. The impression of sharing can be quite moving if one is kindly disposed toward the person, and may significantly enhance one’s affection for that person. Sharing one’s own feelings with the other person may likewise be both endearing and deeply satisfying (for reasons clearly operative but less clearly explicable). For two persons with mutual tender feelings for each other, moments of such sharing can be mutually precious. In contrast, if one has prior bad feelings toward the other person, sharing the person’s feelings or sharing one’s own feelings tends instead to be distasteful or annoying.
	To sum matters up, echoing in general makes the feelings of others vividly present, more salient and difficult to ignore. If the echoed feelings are positive, echoing may lead to caring for the other person, and possibly for other persons more generally. If one has prior good feeling towards the person, echoing negative feelings can incline one toward caring action. Good feeling toward the person can also lead to one’s adopting the person’s echoed emotional attitudes, as well as to one’s feeling good about sharing feelings, both those of the person and one’s own.
	(6) Overstated Claims
	It is worth asking whether the impression of actually being invaded by the other person’s feelings is an accurate one. Can the feelings of the other person actually be transmitted to one’s own body? It would seem they cannot. The other person’s feelings are clearly still situated in the other’s body whereas the echoing feelings are clearly situated in one’s own. If the feelings were strictly identical, they would be in two places at once, doubled but identical, hardly a plausible state of affairs. Furthermore, compared to the feelings actually experienced by the other person, the feelings experienced in oneself are somewhat abstract and incomplete. They are of a general nature, and specific only with regard to the actually perceived aspects of the other’s feelings (stance, tensions, facial expression). Other aspects such as a sinking feeling in the stomach, a bubbly feeling in the lower throat, or a tight contraction about the lungs, are either vague or absent. In addition, what one feels may be an inaccurate echo due to personal idiosyncracies or to misreading, as when ecstacy is misread as agony.  
	In these circumstances it seems unwarranted to claim that in affective echoing, the echoing feelings are literally identical with the feelings echoed. Rather the situation is closer to that which obtains with regard to thinking and having the same thoughts as another person: the postulation of an identity is an unwarranted ontological leap. The affective atmosphere experienced by both onself and the other person might in principle be identical, but the fact that the same surrounds at one time may for different persons have a different atmosphere, strongly suggests that affective atmospheres are not objective characteristics of the world.
	The second earlier-mentioned claim about empathy, that empathy is “a crucial source and sustainer” of caring for others (Slote, 2007,p.15) turns out likewise to be an overstatement. That claim gains considerable plausibility from the widespread practice of fostering good behavior in children through teaching empathy, e.g., through having them imagine what another person feels when treated badly. Batson, Hoffman, and Slote all base their endorsement of the claim on the findings of a number of psychological studies that show that individuals more endowed with empathy display a greater degree of caring (Slote 2007, p. 15). However, the studies are hardly conclusive; not only do they fail to give an adequate explanation of how empathy could foster caring, but they establish a mere correlation, not a causal link, and that because they do not exclude the possibility that the correlated increases are in fact both the work of some third variable such as interest in, or liking for other persons.
	Several other points counter the notion that empathy is the source of caring. One is that in cases where exposure to another’s positive feelings ends up generating feelings of caring for the person, the exposure would undoubtedly to some extent be pleasant and promotive of caring even if no echoing took place. Echoing makes feelings more present and more intense, and so leads more quickly to caring. However, as in the scenario sketched earlier, the other person’s positive feelings are indispensable to the creation of caring, and consequently it is they rather than echoing that should be deemed ‘the source’ of caring. In addition, as noted earlier, concern for an afflicted person cannot arise simply from the echoed feelings of affliction. It must come from elsewhere, either from an innate reflex or instinct, or from some acquired disposition. There is but sparse evidence to support the notion that one instinctively cares for other animate beings. Indeed, like any emotion, compassion, is an innate capacity whose object is learnt. Acquired dispositions to care are ubiquitous and varied. One may come to care about something (or someone) because it gives one pleasure, is entertaining, is interesting and engaging, is familiar and reassuring, promotes one’s self-esteem or one’s power, is attractive, is admirable, is awesome, or is precious. Any of the wealth of the positive feelings that another person may elicit, can lead to a disposition to care about that person.
	Appreciative feelings towards certain individuals tend to expand involuntarily through non-linguistic passive generalization into an appreciation of other persons generally. Just as bad experiences with others may lead to one’s automatically responding to others with suspicion, wariness, or aversion, good experiences may lead to one’s automatically being kindly disposed towards others. When so disposed, one’s caring response to the plight of a stranger ceases to be puzzling.  
	The conclusion suggested by the above considerations is that the source of caring for others is not affective echoing (or by extension, other forms of empathy), but rather the positive feelings that persons exhibit and elicit. Affective echoing makes one feel what the other’s feelings are like, and so may in many circumstances be an invaluable assist in the promotion of caring, but its role is one of facilitating the natural propensity of good feeling.
	It is perhaps worth noting that the further claim put forth by Hoffman and Slote that empathic caring is the foundation of morality, is likewise an overstatement. A feeling of moral obligation, an ‘ought’, is unique in nature, and as David Hume perspicaciously observed (1960, p. 469), is not logically derivable from factual data about the world. Nor is it derivable from feelings of caring, any more than from feelings of liking or dislike. However, feelings of moral obligation do seem both natural and appropriate with regard to anything deemed precious, in particular, other persons. An ethics of caring that does not ask the question of why one should care for others, misses the foundational and experiential fact that persons are precious, and as such ought to be respected, protected, and fostered.
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^1	  For a slightly more extensive account, see Johnstone, 1999.
^2	 A classical objection to the perception of cross-modal similarity is that it is precluded by the enormous difference between the body as lived and the body as seen. Phenomenologists Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi have recently argued that the gap between the two can only be bridged by an innate ‘intermodal tie’ or mechanism, (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2012, p. 209; Zahavi, 1999, p. 171). In support for their claim they appeal to the fact that a newborn infant will often stick out its tongue in response to seeing an adult do so (Meltzoff and Moore, 1977). However, the positing of innate ties of the sort is both implausible and unnecessary. Phenomenological investigation invariably finds any cognition to be the fruit of past experience, not something innate. Moreover, to explain imitative tongue protrusion as an innate mechanism is to endow the infant with innate responses that are biologically frivolous unlike innate responses generally such as sneezing, blinking, or shivering. Finally, a newborn has been aware of its own lived face since its first consciousness in the womb, and since a lived face and a visual face have both the same fundamental structure and dynamics, the newborn can hardly fail to experience a visual face as familiar. 
